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Abstract:  Despite  the  incredible  amount  of  literature  written  about  interreligious
dialoguing,  scant  critical  attention  has  been  devoted  to  mapping  out  the  potential
logical consequences of the enterprise. This is regrettable, especially given the high
hopes  many  expect  to  achieve  through  participation.  The  critical  literature  from
various traditions was reviewed using textual criticism as the analytical lens. Seven
logical  outcomes  were  subsequently  identified  and  explicated  herein  using  the
following  taxonomy.  Namely:  (a)  nothing  happened,  (b)  understanding,  (c)
insightfulness, (d) tolerance, (e) conversion, (f) frustration, and (g) defection. It was
concluded  that  the  a  priori  understanding  of  these  potential  outcomes  would
significantly  moderate  future  delegate  expectations.  In  addition,  professional
awareness  of  the  range,  depth  and  contours  of  these  dialogic  consequences  had
important  ramifications  for  both  participant  preparation  and  event  organisation.
Practical  suggestions  for  dealing  with  various  impediments  were  proffered  as
appropriate. Further research into this important praxis area was recommended. 
Introduction
It  is  becoming increasingly self-evident  that  "religions  no  longer  live  in  splendid
isolation  from  each  other"  (Fredericks,  1998,  p.  171).  As  such,  this  means  that
refusing "dialogue today could be an act of fundamental human irresponsibility--in
Judeo-Christian terms, a sin" (Swidler, 1990, p. 14). So, it is not too surprising to find
that much time and energy has been devoted in the recent past to official dialoguing
activities  throughout  the  world.  For  example,  the  Roman  Catholic-Classical
Pentecostal dialogue ran for approximately seventeen years (Sandidge, 1992) while
the Roman Catholic-Lutheran dialogue lasted thirty years (Brunett, 1999). Given this
incredible investment in time and energy, what outcomes can one legitimately expect
from  the  enterprise?  Despite  the  incredible  amount  of  literature  written  about
interreligious dialoguing, scant  critical  attention has been devoted to exploring the
possible  logical  outcomes  of  all  this  work,  and  especially  documented  in  one
convenient  spot.  This  academic  deficiency was  deemed  in  need  of  urgent  repair.
Consequently, the substantive critical literature from various traditions was reviewed,
and  integrated  into  the  text  to  enhance  narrative  coherence  (albeit,  with  a  strong
reportage  flavour),  using  textual  criticism  as  the  analytical  lens.  This  precursory
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investigation revealed seven logical possibilities worthy of explication. Namely: (a)
nothing happened, (b) understanding, (c) insightfulness, (d) tolerance, (e) conversion,
(f) frustration, and (g) defection. The following is a brief explication of each of these
outcome possibilities.
Consequence #1 - Nothing Happened: Real or Imagined?
Overlooking for the moment that dialogue can beget more dialogue, one of the first
claimed  results  for  an  event  is  that  "nothing  happened."  After  all,  as  Stanley  J.
Samartha (1981, p. 9) pointed out: "No dialogue can ever be automatically successful"
nor:
…can we forget that the discovery of truth is not inevitable. The possibility of error,
distortion,  and  confusion  are  present  in  situations  of  dialogue  as  in  any  human
situation.  There  is  no  guarantee  that  all  dialogues  will  automatically  lead  the
participants into fuller truth (p. 14).
Broadly speaking, "nothing happened" is a logical possibility; neither side gained nor
lost  anything during the process.  In practice however,  this  response  is  unrealistic.
Dialoguers do change as a result of expose to knowledge and experience. Even no
progress in the short-term is a result that will change expectations, attitudes and future
participant behaviour in the long-term. Nor should this "nothing happened" response
be dismissed automatically just because it is only a logical possibility. It is a useful
pragmatic point to make to those faiths, especially new ones or ones inexperienced in
dialoguing who fear contamination or conversion, and where a "the-others-weren’t-
affected-so-why-don’t-you-try-it" style of pre-dialogue argument could be proffered
for anxiety reduction reasons.
Eventually,  the  notion  of  nothing happening in  the  short-term can  be  widened  to
accommodate  the  notion  of  mutual  transformation  in  the  long-term.  On the  other
hand,  if  the  dialogue  devolved  into  two  monologues,  then  in  reality,  nothing
constructive  did  happen;  but  then  it  would  not  be  a  dialogue  (Kozlovic,  2003),
whether true or otherwise! Nor would the opportunity for it present itself very soon
because  of  this  communications  collapse  and  associated  mistrust.  As  Norman
Solomon  (1991,  p.  38)  bluntly  argued:  "Missionizing  undermines  confidence  and
trust.  If  Christians  target  Jews  in  their  "missions,"  there  will  be  no  dialogue;
Christians will be talking to themselves, for no Jew will willingly stay to listen." This
general  stance  is  obviously  antithetical  to  the  goal  of  the  dialogue  enterprise.
Religious  dialoguing  is  not  institutionalised  proselytization  or  covert  evangelism
designed  to  change  one’s  religious  allegiance,  nor  is  it  a  sublimated  adjunct  of
religious colonialism in the form of spiritual-cum-institutional imperialism.
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Consequence  #2  -  Understanding  the  Other  and  the  Dialogic
Process
Official  dialoguing shows  how religions  feel,  behave  and think  on  various  issues
during the act of exchanging information, and so one ""of the more obvious results of
this  kind of formal  dialogue is  the death of mythologies." Ignorance on each side
about the Other is removed and a broader understanding of each other is obtained"
(Sandidge, 1992, p. 243). This is always a useful first step towards understanding and
growth.  However,  it  is  important  to  realise  that  understanding the Other  does  not
necessarily mean agreeing, approving, or supporting the position of the Other. After
all, one may understand, but not necessarily condone ritual sacrifice, or when Jesus
Christ  dealt  positively with  the adulterous  woman (John  8:1-11 KJV) he was not
recommending the life style! As the Lutheran World Federation and World Council of
Churches put it: "Entering into dialogue does not mean that one supports or ascribes
to the ideas or activities of the other. And dialogue does not mean that all will agree.
The  creative  tension  of  mutual  critique  is  also  a  part  of  dialogue"  (Brockway &
Rajashekar, 1987, p. 177). Nor can it be "expected that one renounce one’s faith in
order to understand another religion. If interreligious dialogue is at all possible, it is
not by renouncing all proclamation, commitment, and confession" (Krieger, 1993, p.
351).
Contrary to  popular  belief,  true  dialogue  is  not  "a  form of  compromise  on  truth"
(Mitri,  1995,  p.  23)  and  it  "does  not  portend  capitulation  but  interreligious
understanding  and  the  lessening  of  tensions"  (Saliba,  1993,  p.  78).  Nevertheless,
dialogue  does  involve  "a  continuing  process  of  learning  and  re-education"
(Braybrooke, 1993a, p. 108), especially since dialogue "with ecumenical partners also
elicits internal dialogue with Churches" (Brunett, 1999, p. 305). Indeed, the modern
American witch Marion Weinstein (1991) considered such educative exchanges to be
an essential prerequisite for her pagan appreciation of holism. As she argued:
I believe deeply in the enrichment of cross-fertilization  and the sharing process of
spiritual  traditions,  rather than total  superimposition  of one tradition  on another.  I
have begun to glimpse the riches of certain African and Native American magical
traditions -- to name but two -- which have nourished my own work and outlook. I
suspect that these traditions would be helpful to many spiritually deprived, "rational"
types in the West. For me, "holistic" (which is as good a word as any for the thought-
mode of occult work) means "all-inclusive"; to deny any aspect of one’s own cultural
heritage, or to deny the existence (in potential) of any other cultural heritage, is not
holistic.  It  is  a  screening-out  process  --  "rational,"  sequential,  linear  and  limiting.
"Holistic" does not mean either/or, it does not mean instead of, or in denial of, or in
replacement of. It means all-together" (pp. 264-265).
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To use  Karl  Barth’s  words  in  a  positive,  revisionist  way, "to  dialogue with  other
religions was to howl with wolves (‘heulen mit den Wolfen’)" (Narchison, 1998, p.
61).  Therefore,  the  greater  (wolf  pack?)  exposure  to  spiritual  cross-fertilisation
through mutual dialoguing, the greater the information transmitted and received, and
hopefully  the  greater  the  opportunity  for  deeper  understanding.  This  process  can
create greater thirst for knowledge and even explicit calls for it, as has been reported
in the past:
As we came towards the end of the three-year project people commented that they had
learnt  not  only about  other  faiths,  but  so much more  about  their  own beliefs  and
practices by having to explain them to others. Many felt a sense of loss at the thought
that mutual cooperation and learning was coming to an end. As one Muslim phrased
it: "We have learned to understand and trust one another; is it not possible to continue
doing so?" (Hall, 1987, p. 29).
One  is  impelled  to  state  an  emphatic  ‘Yes!’  And  then  quickly  proclaim:  "The
symposium will end…but the dialogue must go on" (Pereira, 1987, p. 276) just as
Imre Miklos, Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs in the Hungarian government did after
the  Budapest  1986  Catholic-Marxist  Dialogue.  This  sort  of  spontaneous  practical
result  supported  Maura  O’Neill’s  (1990,  p.  104)  claim  that  dialogue  "is  a
commitment. The more one engages in it, the greater is the perspective and the goal"
(and assuming it was true dialogue, not confrontational debate).
There are of course many benefits to be gained from dialoguing. For example, Fr.
Thomas  Keating  (1993)  reported  how  his  encounter  between  Buddhist,  Hindu,
Islamic,  Jewish,  Native American, Protestant,  Roman Catholics,  Russian Orthodox
and Tibetan Buddhists  resulted  in his  group becoming more cohesive,  honest  and
relishing the event. As he claimed:
We were surprised and delighted to find many points of similarity and convergence in
our respective paths. Like most people of our time, we originally expected that we
would  find  practically  nothing  in  common.  In  the  years  that  followed  we
spontaneously and somewhat hesitatingly began to take a closer look at certain points
of  disagreement  until  these  became  our  main  focus  of  attention.  We  found  that
discussing our points of disagreement increased the bonding of the group even more
than discovering our points of agreement. We became more honest in stating frankly
what we believed and why, without at the same time making any effort to convince
others of our own position. We simply presented our understanding as a gift to the
group (p. 108).
That very act can help participants understand the process better because dialogue "is
first a practice (and a difficult one) before theories on dialogue or conclusions on the
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results of dialogue are forthcoming" (Tracy, 1990, p. 76). Having experienced it in a
visceral way, participants can relish the opportunity to learn from their encounters and
feed this understanding back into the next one, as well as forward their fruits onto
their own congregations. However, exactly what will be learnt is unclear:
…some will ask, where will it all lead? History is open-ended; interreligious dialogue,
just begun, is open-ended. What the future will bring the Christian religion, we do not
know. And what the future will bring the non-Christian religions, we do not know
(Kung, 1988, p. 250).
Indeed, a "truly dialogical relationship has no other purpose than itself. Dialogue is the
end of dialogue" (Lochhead, 1988, p. 79). However, there are at least two ways it can
legitimately end. As Paul Mojzes (1989a, p. 206) put it:  "one cannot speak of the
"death" of dialogue, unless the partners decide to eliminate one another by warfare, or
unless one or both of them should vanish as viable life styles." If war occurs, then
dialogue  per  se  has  drastically  failed.  If  religions  vanish,  then  they  have  been
consigned to the dustbin of history to be rediscovered, raked over and argued about by
future archaeologists,  historians and religionists,  as currently happens with Ancient
Egyptian religion.
Consequence  #3  -  Insightfulness  into  One’s  Own  Faith  and
Sharing it with Coreligionists
The very act of participants conversing with other faiths can have positive personal
benefits.  The  many  "who  have  pioneered  the  search  for  good  relations  between
religious communities…have found that learning about other religious traditions has
helped them appreciate their  own more deeply" (Braybrooke, 1993b, p. 120).  In a
synergistic fashion, "the power of encountering the deep faith of a religious person
from another tradition has the potential of unleashing a search for one’s own spiritual
roots  and  yearnings"  (Boys,  Lee  & Bass,  1995,  p.  265).  How?  Because  dialogue
"helps any careful thinker to rediscover one’s own identity. Sometimes, indeed, only
such dialogue can help one discover that identity - as if for the first time" (Tracy,
1994/95, p. 109). Therefore, to ""understand" another religion in the full sense of the
word can only be possible -- and responsible -- when it leads us to a more complete
understanding of our own tradition, that is, when the dialogue strengthens, deepens,
and completes our own faith on all  levels" (Krieger, 1993, p. 353). It can do this
because:
…as awareness expands,  human life intensifies, moving toward the bursting of all
bounds--for  which  all  religions  and  other  worldviews  have  specific  terms:  for
example, moksha or liberation (Hindu), nirvana or "reality" (Buddhist), basileia theou
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or reign of God (Christian). It is that Omega point of total awareness toward which all
human life tends (Swidler, 1990, p. 71).
This phenomenon of rediscovery, strengthening and deeper appreciation was proudly
proclaimed  by  the  Christian  Donald  Swearer  (1977,  p.  20)  when  he  said:  "my
involvement in the study and teaching of Buddhism has enlarged and deepened my
own particular faith stance." For Revd. Paul A. Crow Jr. (2000, p. 96), his "life and
understanding of the Gospel and the church were transformed" when he chose to study
and  then  worship  with  the  Orthodox  Church.  Personal  religious  growth  was  also
proudly proclaimed  by M.  Darrol  Bryant  (1990,  p.  20).  She  confessed  that:  "my
encounter with men and women of other faiths  led to  a revitalization  of my own
faith." This positive phenomenon was also evidenced by Mary C. Boys. She proudly
claimed that:  "I simply cannot imagine being Catholic without being engaged with
Protestants and Jews: They challenge me to new ways of understanding and proffer
occasions for "holy envy," yet paradoxically deepen my own religious commitments"
(Boys, Lee & Bass, 1995, p. 272). By "holy envy" she meant "experiencing something
so profound in the beliefs,  rituals,  polity or practices of another tradition that  one
wishes his or her own community of faith also had (or practiced) it" (p. 273).
Such faith-stance growth can occur in two basic ways. Firstly, the participants are
forced  to  understand  their  own  beliefs  better  when  intellectually  challenged  by
competing belief systems. Especially, if Paul Mojzes’ (1978, p. 11) 19th ground rule
is  applied,  namely:  "Challenge  one  another  to  be  faithful  to  your  own search  for
truth." This was also Revd. Crow Jr.’s (2000, p. 96) advice to those wanting to pursue
the ecumenical vision as a vocation. He suggested that they: "Select some sectarian
person and engage them for six months in constructive dialogue and heated debate
about  God’s  call  to  visible  unity,  diversity,  and evangelization."  However,  before
doing  so  officially  (as  opposed  to  unofficially,  privately,  personally),  participants
should be quite knowledgeable to start with to fulfil competency criteria (Kozlovic,
2001).  Such  challenges  will  no  doubt  spur  on  participants  to  do  more  exhaustive
homework and so they will end up knowing more about the Other, which is always a
useful step in the understanding process. Indeed:
It may be that what my dialogue partners will speak of is their experience of that same
reality that I know in Jesus Christ as God. If so, fine; I have much to learn from them.
But it may be that they will speak of something else, something of which I am even
less well informed. If so, I must listen all the more intently. I will have all the more
homework to do afterwards in integrating what I learn with what I thought I knew. I
will need to revise not only my theology but, perchance, my metaphysics. But surely
that is nothing against this approach. Surely Christians must be as open to revising
metaphysics as to revising theology (Cobb Jr., 1988, p. 97).
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Secondly, dialoguers can understand their own faith better by seeing it mirrored from
different  perspectives  not  previously considered.  Precisely because  of  the  mindset
which  is  automatically  inherited  when  learning  one’s  own  faith  in  its  traditional
religious packaging (akin to professional blindness). Therefore:
Through interreligious,  interideological  dialogue  we will  come to know better  our
own religious, ideological selves with all their consistencies and contradictions, their
admirable and abhorrent aspects. Our dialogue partners will serve as mirrors for us,
showing us our true selves. Such a prize alone is worth the price of frustration in
dialogue (Swidler, 1988b, pp. 26-27).
This  prized  mirroring is  similar  to  understanding a  religious tradition  historically,
sociologically, anthropologically, psychologically, philosophically etc. The answer is
not  so  much  wrong,  just  different.  And  the  more  differences  one  gets  the  more
comprehensive is the understanding of the totality of the religion, which can quickly
exceed its traditional conceptualisation. As Avery Dulles (1992) argued:
My own involvement in ecumenism over the past forty years has led me to cherish
other values. I have acquired a deeper realization of how much the Catholic Church
has to contribute from the wealth of its own heritage. At the same time I have gained
an enormous respect for the other churches that have venerable traditions of their own.
The Orthodox, I have found, possess an immensely rich heritage of Trinitarian and
sacramental  piety  handed  down  from  the  Eastern  fathers.  They have  a  sense  of
spiritual  communion  (or  koinonia)  that  supplements  and  partly  corrects  the  more
legalistic approach characteristic of the West. From Lutherans and other Protestants I
have learned the spiritual power of a theology of the word of God that is capable of
completing and balancing the more sacramental vision of the Catholic and Orthodox
churches (pp. 192-193).
In  a  sense,  this  is  the  religious  application  of  the  social  scientist’s  triangulation
methodology,  that  is,  where  there  is  "strength  in  the  converging  of  weaknesses"
(Williamson,  Harp  &  Dalphin,  1977,  p.  84).  Or  it  is  the  equivalent  of  the
psychologist’s figure-ground perception concept (Adams, 1973). Where, for example,
a  black background is  needed before one  can truly appreciate  a  contrasting white
foreground figure,  and where white on white  (or black on black) would make the
figure indistinguishable. Indeed, Christian theology itself can be in peril if dialogue is
eschewed. How? Because:
Many  theologians  have  concluded  that  theology  cannot  continue  to  be  made  in
isolation  from an  interior  dialogue with  other  religious  traditions,  that  in  fact  the
future of Christian theology lies in the deepest possible assimilation of the spirit and
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findings  of  other  religions.  The  data  from non-Christian  religions  has  become an
essential element for theological reflection… (Richard, 1981, p. 2).
Overall,  dialogue requires "a willingness to be persuaded that reality might not be
exactly what  we thought,  and that  there  could  be  some truth for  us  yet to  learn"
(Peters, 1986, p. 885). Besides, each "tradition has its blind spots. Yet by genuinely
dialoguing with people deeply rooted in different faith traditions we might look for a
moment through their eyes and see what our own blind spot prevents us from seeing.
And this is sheer joy" (Shapiro, 1989, p. 37). Of course, this sheer joy needs to be
shared,  as  embodied  in  Leonard  Swidler’s  (1983)  2nd  dialogue  commandment.
Namely:
Because of the "corporate" nature of interreligious dialogue…it is also necessary that
each participant enter into dialogue not only with his partner across the faith line - the
Lutheran with the Anglican, for example - but also with his coreligionists, with his
fellow Lutherans, to share with them the fruits  of the interreligious dialogue. Only
thus can the whole community eventually learn and change, moving toward an ever
more perceptive insight into reality (p. 2).
Raimundo Panikkar (1975) argued for the same thing in his I:9 principle:
No  inter-religious  dialogue  can  yield  any fruit  unless  it  is  (at  least  logically  and
anthropologically)  preceded  by  an  intra-religious  dialogue  within  the  partners
themselves…only  those  who  can  critically  undergo  an  internal  dialogue  within
themselves are ready for religious dialogue (p. 408).
This is one good reason why the French Bishops (Murphy, 1978, p. 150) required
their dialogue participants to debate amongst their brothers in the faith (Guideline 4).
Then of course, "Interreligious dialogue is also intrareligious dialogue" (Mitra, 1986,
p. 122) because "Interreligious dialogue focused on justice [for example] promotes
intrareligious dialogue concerning ultimate and penultimate values" (Suchocki, 1987,
p. 160). Therefore, in principle, one should not tolerate limits on gaining insights, or
in  sharing  the  good  news  of  the  dialogue  to  all  interested  parties  if  desired  and
appropriate.
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Consequence #4 - Tolerance and an Increase in the Public Good
During  the  act  of  listening,  dialoguers  are  inherently  forced  to  be  tolerant  of
competing  belief  systems  because  they  need  to  know  what  is  being  said  fairly,
accurately and correctly before they can respond appropriately. Patience and attentive
perception during dialoguing:
…involves tolerating, that is, accepting, enduring, bearing, putting up with; it involves
acceptance in the sense of refraining from any strong reaction to the thing in question;
it is half-hearted, an attitude towards something that is not liked, loved, respected, or
approved of; and it is often, though not always, understood as a praiseworthy act or
virtue (Newman, 1982, p. 6).
Tolerance is thus a practical consequence because the participants are also Sources
and Receivers within a transactional model of human communication (DeVito, 1991;
Kozlovic, 2003). They become tolerant because of either the fear of getting-as-good-
as-they-give, and/or a desire to be treated in a fair, principled way because this is the
way they want to be treated (i.e., mutual respect given in a reciprocal manner). Thus,
one of the biggest barriers to dialogue is quickly demolished. However, tolerance does
not  mean  giving  in,  which  is  a  useful  point  to  stress  to  the  more  anxious
faiths/religions/ participants. Also:
…the importance of interreligious dialogue is not to reach common convictions on the
basis of meta-religious criteria, but to achieve an attitude of mutual respect, of mutual
willingness to listen and to learn, of mutual readiness to cooperate for the well-being
of all humankind in spite of our differences on the touchstones of reality (Mulder,
1989, pp. 209-210).
This was also the third criteria of Scott Daniel Dunbar’s (1998, p. 456) four essential
criteria for interreligious dialogue. Namely, "a mutual attitude of respect and open-
mindedness, implying a willingness to learn and grow from the other." By cultivating
this  tolerance-inspired,  open-minded  mutual  respect,  many wonderful  cooperative
ventures can be achieved. For example:
Improved interreligious relations have resulted in a number of ways for Christians to
join with others in the promotion of peace, justice, and the common good. Thus, a
public spirituality has emerged that characterizes those who have crossed religious
lines to join in special projects to negotiate the end to war, to apply moral pressure for
nuclear disarmament and an end to violence as a political and social method, and to
meet  the  needs  of  those  who  are  oppressed,  impoverished,  and  underprivileged
(Borelli, 1993, p. 552).
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Not only is dialoguing a significant force for societal good, but it must transcend itself
to keep on doing public good otherwise stagnation sets in. Dialogue allows one to
understand the  Other  better  while  learning the  skills  of  cooperation and enriching
one’s faith/religious/ideological stance. In this  way, dialoguing is  an instrument of
social  change  that  needs  to  keep  sharpening  its  tools  if  it  is  to  stay pointed  and
relevant.
Interestingly, Robert Traer (1993, p. 115) saw dialogue as the means for fostering the
legal, ethical and spiritual quest  for truth and religious freedom. How? Because to
"pursue the truth, without standing up for the rights of others to pursue the truth in
their own ways, as religious communities and individually within those communities,
would be to reduce freedom to privileged piety." This attitude fits in nicely with Prof.
Michael Pye’s (2001, p. 5) advocated concept of "soft" dialogue, namely, dialogue
that  is  "gentle,  patient,  imaginative and creative,  leaving many questions open for
future consideration." Therefore, if dialoguers’ tools are not kept pointed and relevant,
if  the  pursuit  of  truth and religious  freedom is  abandoned,  and if  "soft" styles of
dialogue are not actively encouraged, then the consequences can be disastrous.  As
Prof.  Mallam Ishaq  Oloyede  reminded  his  fellow conference  delegates:  "the  only
alternative  to  dialogue  is  conflict;  if  you  believe  dialogue  is  bad,  war  is  worse"
(quoted  in  Blombery,  1991,  p.  30)!  On  the  other  hand,  it  appears  that  for  some
Fundamentalists,  war  may be  a  preferable  option  to  their  biggest  and  repeatedly
expressed fear, namely, the spectre of conversion (Dhalla, 1989, p. 39; Klenicki, 1984,
p. 102).
Consequence #5 - Conversion: How to Ameliorate the Fear?
Although De Silva claimed in his 1st dialogue aspect that dialogue "does not in any
way diminish full and loyal commitment to one’s own faith, but rather enriches and
strengthens  it"  (quoted  in  Samartha,  1981,  p.  59),  this  claim  is  not  strictly  true.
Dialogue can be like that, and for many, it is like that, but for others, dialogue poses a
serious challenge. Not surprisingly, sympathy, tolerance and being truthful to oneself,
to  the  Other  and  to  God  can  seriously  disturb  believers’  predetermined  faith
commitments and related loyalties. How? Because:
…we may find the very foundation of those things we cherish most deeply shaken in
ways we did not anticipate and do not want. Many a theological student has become
involved in study of and conversation with other faith traditions only to find him - or
herself uprooted and disconnected from previously sustaining elements of Christian
faith (Smith, 1991, p. 72).
Such  an  exposure  can  nurture  strong  pro-Other  feelings  and  tempt  believers  to
convert,  a  phenomenon  that  Sarah  Cunningham (1987,  p.  11)  referred  to  as  "co-
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optation." This is an occupational hazard for interreligious dialoguers and akin to the
Human Resource Manager who after giving a staff course on career planning, follows
his own advice and leaves his own company for greener pastures.
Indeed, many conversion accounts exist  within the literature (Carmel, 1968; Gruss,
1979),  and  it  is  a  potential  outcome  openly  conceded  by  many  dialoguers.  For
example, Philip H. Hwang (1989) argued:
…we must admit the genuine possibility for us to be converted to other religions. If
we are really open-minded and honestly acknowledge the similarities and differences
between religions, in the due process of time, it is quite possible to come to believe
that the religions of other people are somehow much better than ours in many ways…
one  must  be  willing  to  be  converted,  and  risk  all  the  consequences.  Unless,  we
seriously entertain this sad thing, yes it is a sad possibility, we will not have a genuine
dialogue (p. 13).
Or as David J. Hesselgrave (1978, p. 227) flippantly put it: "about all one can lose in
interreligious dialogue is face and faith." For professed true believers, loss of their
faith  is something to really fear,  and which dialogue organisers  should address by
stressing that  this  is  not  the explicit  intent  of  dialoguing (even if  it  is  a  potential
outcome). For example, Jean-Claude Basset (1992) boldly asserted in his 10th rule:
…dialogue should not coerce anybody into renouncing his or her convictions, even
missionary. Instead it should offer a space where everybody may give witness to one’s
living faith, with its certainties, questions and expectations. To renounce envy for the
spiritual and social strengths of other communities, rejoicing at their deficiencies and
difficulties, and even more so, not attempting to subvert their destiny, rules out neither
emulation in human solidarity, nor the quest for truth (p. 39).
Similarly, Paul Mojzes (1978, p. 11) stated in his 24th ground rule that: "You must
not try to convert your partner, or the dialogue may turn again into a monologue."
Indeed, a "fundamental ground rule for any dialogue between Christians and Jews
must be this: there can never be a question of Christians attempting to convert Jews to
Christianity" (Cox, 1989, p. 121). Instead, true "interreligious dialogue must deepen
and purify all religions and, in a certain sense, preserve their uniqueness" (Krieger,
1993, p. 353).
Unfortunately, some dialoguers believe otherwise. As one Christian said: "Our aim
will be that the Muslim should be converted to faith in Jesus Christ…[on the grounds
that] he may well despise the lack of sure faith implied by a form of dialogue which
does  not  seek  to  convince  and  convert  him" (Goldsmith,  1982,  pp.  120-121)!  Its
Muslim equivalent is just as worrying: "Thanks to your democratic laws [Christian]
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we will  invade you: thanks to our religious laws [Islamic]  we will  dominate you"
(Bernardini,  2000,  p.  53)!  During  the  three-day  Budapest  1986  Catholic-Marxist
Dialogue: "One thing was clear to the Catholics: their partners in dialogue wanted to
remain  Marxists;  they  were  not  ready  to  abandon  metaphysical  materialism  or
atheism" (Pereira, 1987, p. 275). Nor should they be expected too if they were not
convinced otherwise by faith, logic or God!
Fortunately, there are  many useful  strategies  to  ameliorate  the  fear  of  conversion.
Firstly, be frank about such conversion possibilities, and point out that in well run
dialogues the event organisers will be addressing the problem. Secondly, by asking
participants  to  invoke  the  power  of  their  own  protective  deities  for  comfort  and
security (e.g., God, Archangel Michael, Krishna, Sai Baba) with appropriate scriptural
recitations if needed. For example, for Christians, reminding them of Matthew 18:20
(KJV): "For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the
midst of them" keeping a watchful eye out. Thirdly, by repeating Ted Peters (1986)
logical argument:
Yes, it  is quite likely that dialogue will  change our minds.  But there is absolutely
nothing to fear on this score. If the God in whom we believe is in fact the creator and
reconciler of the cosmos, then there is no truth - if it be genuine truth and not just
partisan propaganda - that we could ever learn that could possibly lead us away from
God (p. 885).
This tactic is highly recommended. Fourthly, if more support is needed, then a useful
strategy is  to  point  to  the  need  for  a  common meeting ground.  Put  another  way:
"While neither partner is out to "convert" the other, the element of conversion in this
sense of metanoia must be there in the heart of both. It is in this sense that we see the
dialogical process as ‘creating one heart’" (Coff, 1989, p. 210). In fact, the Christian
M. Thomas Thangaraj (1991) saw mutually beneficial conversion as a necessity for
missio ecclesiae, but one which also needed to contain elements of responsibility and
regard for the Other. As he argued:
The church will and should continue to bear witness to the love of God expressed in
the life, ministry, death, and resurrection of Christ; but it can do so only in a setting of
mutual  witness,  allowing our partners in  dialogue to witness to  us  regarding their
experience and vision of the mighty and salvific acts of God. Similarly, conversion
will have to be defined as a two-way traffic wherein we are all converted to and by
each other, which is different from an understanding of conversion as contributing to
church growth (p. 175).
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In short, conversion is positively characterised as a means of creating Coff’s (1989, p.
210) "one heart," the soft form of positive conversion. Fifthly, Arvind Sharma (1998)
posited the following argument for the anxious believers:
In a dialogical situation…truth is indivisible - I have it, but you may have it too. In
order for both of us to share it, if both of us have it in some sense, it must find a place
in-between us. I do not have to go over to your side; you do not have to come over to
my side; it is still indivisible and it can still be shared but by perambulation (from side
to side) rather than transition (from one side to another) (p. 36).
That is,  the spaces betwixt  faiths/religions where one can safely meet.  Sixthly, for
those  still  fearful  of  conversion,  another  tactic  is  to  point  to  the  method  of  the
Permanent  Council  of  the  French  Bishops  for  forestalling  potential  loss  of  faith
(Murphy,  1978,  p.  150).  Namely,  to  debate  the  different  options  and  social
commitments  amongst  brothers in  the  faith  within  the Church (Guideline  4).  And
secondly,  to  intellectually apply themselves  to  the  renewal  of  their  faith,  and  the
knowledge of the word of God, within the Church (Guideline 5).
Curiously, Paul Mojzes (1989b, p. 4) noted how this fear of conversion plus love for
the Others’ truths prompted some religionists to adopt both religions. "Some people
are so fundamentally affected by their experience with two or more religions that they
feel justified in regarding themselves as adherents of more than one religion (not a
novel  experience  in  the  Orient  but  increasingly commonplace  in  the West)."  This
"dual religious citizenship" (Jochim, 1995, p. 36) was formally evidenced by Charles
Wei-hsun Fu (Taoist/Buddhist), Raimundo Panikkar (Catholic/Hindu/Buddhist), and
Bibhuti S. Yadav (Hindu/Buddhist) as documented in Leonard Swidler’s (1988a, pp.
254-256) Toward a Universal Theology of Religion. Dom Bede Griffiths is another
prominent example of dual religious citizenship. Originally a Benedictine monk of
Prinknash Abbey and then Prior of Farnborough Abbey in England, he went to India
in 1955 to help found Kurisumala Ashram, a monastery of the Syrian rite in Kerala.
However, he was soon dissatisfied with his original religious tradition and so sought a
fusion between Judaic and Vedic revelations, which he described in The Marriage of
East and West as follows:
I had begun to find that there was something lacking not only in the Western world
but  in  the  Western  Church.  We were  living from one  half  of  our  soul,  from the
conscious, rational level and we needed to discover the other half, the unconscious,
intuitive  dimension.  I  wanted  to  experience  in  my life  the  marriage  of  these  two
dimensions  of  human  existence,  the  rational  and  intuitive,  the  conscious  and
unconscious, the masculine and the feminine. I wanted to find the way to the marriage
of East and West (Griffiths, 1982, p. 8).
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He did this by courageously crossing formal faith lines and searching for his lost half.
Indeed, it  could be argued that Charles Wei-hsun Fu, Raimundo Panikkar, Bibhuti
Yadav  and  Dom  Bede  Griffiths  are  the  human  embodiments  of  interreligious
dialogue.  They  also  appear  to  be  interreligious  equivalents  of  the  Hindu  saint
Ramakrishna whose:
…hunger for experience of the Divine led him to try various religions. As a Hindu he
practiced yoga and worshipped in the spirit of bhakta (that is, he sought God through
faith and devotion); he in turn became a Jain, a Buddhist, a Muslim, and a Christian.
As a Shakta he experienced Brahman; as a Muslim he experienced God as Allah; as a
Christian he knew God in Christ (Christian, 1973, p. 436).
It was a very instructive form of personalised revelatory ecumenism.
Consequence #6 - Frustration: Suppressed Desire?
Whatever the dialogue journey, one is going to be frustrated and experience religious
angst  at  some point  along the way. For example,  Fundamentalists (e.g.,  Jehovah’s
Witnesses,  Mormons)  may  be  disappointed  that  their  biblically  based  words  of
wisdom did not result in the Other’s faith transformation. That is, they did not see the
light, a literal expectation of other Fundamentalists who only need to feel the Holy
Ghost (via glossolalia?) to expect instantaneous conversion, and/or to attribute it to
the  sinners’  acceptance  of  Jesus  Christ  as  their  Lord and Saviour  (e.g.,  Christian
Revivalism).  In  a  very real  sense,  even  if  unarticulated  or  unconscious,  direct  or
indirect, they expect the words to have mystical or quasi-mystical properties which
can trigger conversion experiences, to be "born again" (John 3:3 KJV). Or at least to
protect them as evidenced by Christians who recite The Lord’s Prayer, Hare Krishna’s
who  chant  the  Maha-mantra,  or  Swami  Muktananda’s  and  Swami  Sivananda’s
devotees who sing the Om Namah Sivaya mantra to disperse negativity. In fact, every
major religion has sacred words of power (Crowley & Crowley, 1991), and which can
be effectively integrated into official dialogue events as stress reducers and anxiety
comforters as appropriate.
Regardless  of  whether  this  mystical  conception  of  born-again  dialogue  has  any
ontological reality within official dialogue events, it may still be a dangerous attitude.
Why? Because any expectation of instantaneous faith change triggered by words is not
dialogue per se. Rather, it is a deliberate (surreptitious?) conversion attempt, and thus
a gross violation of both Jean-Claude Basset’s (1992) 10th decalogue item and Paul
Mojzes’ (1978) 24th ground rule which expressly forbids conversion attempts. Indeed,
such  an  expectation  is  itself  an  indication  of  a  profound misunderstanding of  the
human-human  dialogic  process  (Kozlovic,  2003),  and  an  indication  of  an
organisational  error,  namely,  poor  personnel  selection  (Kozlovic,  2001).  Dialogue
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participants  who  purposely  behave  like  this,  as  opposed  to  letting  it  happen
"naturally,"  should  not  have  been  selected  as  official  delegates.  Interestingly,  the
evangelical Christian, Virginia Ramey Mollenkott (1987) offered the following useful
comments to those offended by proselytising Fundamentalists:
The best advise I can offer to people who are disturbed by fundamentalist attempts to
proselytize  is  to  publicize  broadly  and  repeatedly  the  distinction  between
psychological manipulation, materialistic inducement, and unethical coercion on the
one hand, and simple communication of the facts of one’s spiritual journey on the
other (p. 63).
When such unobtrusive-looking, faith-based conversion attempts fail, then these same
Fundamentalists  may begin to  feel  personally inadequate  in  getting their  religious
points across and/or in failing to get a positive outcome for the Lord. However, this
phenomenon may not be limited to just Fundamentalists. All dialoguers at some point
are going to feel less than content about their performances. And then attribute this to
some personal defect  or past  failing;  as indicated by Eric Sharpe’s (1992, p.  232)
teaching tale about the ginger tom cat and its fearful memory of him. Nonetheless, it is
to be expected, judged accordingly, and dare it be said, event organisers should not
pussyfoot around the issue.
Participants may feel inadequate and frustrated because, in the dialogue context, they
can no longer rely upon the following old argument form: "we-believe-in-X-because-
we-are-Y-and-that-is-what-Y’s-believe-in." Other delegates may not be impressed by
this  circular  logic.  Yet  again,  such  an  attempt  would  be  the  result  of  a
misunderstanding  of  the  non-conversion  nature  of  the  dialogic  process,  and  of
ignoring  the  basic  point  that  no  faith/religion/ideology has  a  monopoly  on  truth.
Indeed, Paul Mojzes’ (1978, p. 11) 24th ground rule is useful to recite here. Namely:
"Neither’s  truth  is  absolute.  Each partner  needs  the  Other  in  order  to  get  a  more
complete picture of the truth. Monopoly in thought leads to sluggishness in thinking
and to the perversion of truth." Or as it was artistically expressed by the mystical poet
Kahlil Gibran (1979, p. 66) in The Prophet: "Say not, "I have found the truth," but
rather, "I have found a truth" [my emphasis].
For  the  philosophically  inclined,  Marcus  Braybrooke’s  (1993a,  p.  107)  comment
echoing the neti-neti tradition of Hinduism is proffered: "The Divine transcends our
human thought and language and this involves a recognition of the relativity of all
religious language and symbols. This "forbids any one religion from having the ‘only’
or ‘final’ word."" For participants inclined to using fiction to nourish their faith then
the following Idries Shah’s (1973) Sufi teaching story The Blind Ones and the Matter
of the Elephant is recommended:
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Beyond  Ghor  there  was  a  city.  All  its  inhabitants  were  blind.  A  king  with  his
entourage arrived near by; he brought his army and camped in the desert. He had a
mighty elephant,  which  he  used  in  attack  and  to  increase  the  people’s  awe.  The
populace became anxious to see the elephant, and some sightless from among this
blind community ran like fools to find it. As they did not even know the form or shape
of the elephant they groped sightlessly, gathering information by touching some part
of  it.  Each thought  he  knew something,  because  he could  feel  a part.  When they
returned to their fellow-citizens eager groups clustered around them. Each of these
was anxious, misguidedly, to learn the truth from those who were themselves astray.
They asked about the form, the shape of the elephant: and listened to all they were
told.
The man whose hand had reached an ear was asked about the elephant’s nature. He
said: ‘It is large, rough thing, wide and broad like a rug.’ And the one who had felt the
trunk said: ‘I have the real facts about it. It is like a straight and hollow pipe, awful
and destructive.’ The one who had felt its feet and legs said" ‘It is mighty and firm,
like a pillar.’ Each had felt some part out of many. Each had perceived it wrongly. No
mind knew all: knowledge is not the companion of the blind. All imagined something,
something incorrect (p. 25).
Feelings of inadequacy or frustration may exist because dialoguers looked at only part
of the truth, which did not match the other parts of the truth, which their dialogue
partners  examined.  Of  course,  this  may also  be  an  administrative  function  of  the
complexity of the topic, the number of participants involved, and the time available
for such discussions.
Frustration can also arise because the dialogue has failed to meet the concerns of the
participants, however conceived. For example, Letty Cottin Pogrebin’s black-Jewish
women’s group petered out within two years, despite Maura O’Neill’s (1990) thesis
that  women dialoguing together  to  avoid androcentric  biases  would achieve  some
form of feminist utopia. Or at least to help compensate for Ursula King’s (1998, p. 43)
complaint about female invisibility, marginalisation and exclusion which resembled
"what the French call ‘un dialogue des sourds’ (a dialogue of the deaf)." When Letty
asked an ex-member why people stopped coming to the black-Jewish dialogue she
was curtly told:
"You Jews have to stop acting like God’s chosen people," she barked, her eyes hard
and angry. "The world doesn’t  revolve around you. Relations  with Jews are not a
priority for most African-Americans; our main concern is survival""…In other words,
blacks worry about their actual conditions and fear for the present; Jews worry about
their history and fear for the future (Pogrebin & Hutchinson, 1994, p. 220).
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However, this frustration source can be attributable to the administrative failure of not
setting a mutually beneficial agenda, and then not ensuring its ongoing relevance and
maintenance throughout the course of the dialogue. This is also an apt reminder that
"post-patriarchal dialogue" (King, 1998, p. 52), in this gender exclusivist way, is not
an automatic panacea for feminist ills.
As an important corollary of the above problems, feelings of inadequacy can manifest
themselves as personal depression and/or devalued self-esteem for letting down the
faith/religion/ideological team. After all, the "sheer psychological difficulty for some
Christians of entering into such a dialogue in depth should not be underestimated"
(Sharpe, 1977, p. 142). However, Paul Mojzes’ (1978, p. 11) 15th ground rule is of
some comfort here, namely: "Do not assume that the conclusions reached are final.
There  will  always  be  a  need  for  continual  dialogue  regarding  these  views."  Not
surprisingly, feelings of frustration can elicit violent impulses from even experienced,
knowledgeable and respected dialoguers, such as Prof. Harvey Cox (1989, p. 98). He
toured  Jerusalem  and  engaged  in  an  informal  conversation  with  an  independent
American  Christian  evangelist  who had just  recounted  a  phantasmagoric  end-time
scenario. As he reported: "I was appalled. A strange impulse to reach out and strangle
my new unsought acquaintance rose in me, then subsided." Admittedly, it  was an
informal  conversation,  but  one  can  imagine  similar  feelings  arising during formal
dialogues  (e.g.,  Peters,  1986,  p.  883).  Prof.  Cox’s  (1989) solution of allowing the
violent impulse to subside seems a wise first step, whatever the situation.
Frustration and religious angst may also arise out of the fear of syncretism (i.e., the
fusing of all the world religions) or the fear of indifferentism (i.e., ignoring the basic
distinctive elements of each faith). However,  they have to be balanced against  the
positive gains made. Syncretism and indifferentism may just be another way of saying
"progress;" especially for those religions that found a way around their old theological
stalemates (e.g., the Uniting Church formed from three different denominations). As
De Silva argued in his 2nd dialogue aspect: "Dialogue, far from being a temptation to
syncretism, is a safeguard against it, because in dialogue we get to know one another’s
faith in depth. One’s own faith is tested and refined and sharpened thereby. The real
test of faith is faiths-in-relation" (quoted in Samartha, 1981, p. 59).
For intrareligious dialoguers aiming for an ecumenical vision, then Revd. Crow Jr.’s
(2000, p. 96) advice is pertinent. Namely, "Practice patience, perseverance, spiritual
tenacity, and confidence in God’s power to renew and reconcile God’s people." Or as
Arnold D. Hunt (1975) put it: "The Christian engaged in dialogue has to trust the Holy
Spirit  and  believe  that  the  outcome is  in  God’s  hands."  For  those  Christians  still
frustrated, then the following rationale is advocated:
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A  simple,  overarching,  organic,  world  religion-ideology  is  not  the  goal  of
interreligious, interideological dialogue. Rather, the goals could be said to be three:
(1)  to  know  oneself  ever  more  profoundly;  (2)  to  know  the  other  ever  more
authentically; (3) to live ever more fully accordingly (Swidler, 1988b, p. 26).
This statement could form the motto, credo and mission statement of the religious
dialogue enterprise. Of course, this does not mean that dialoguing is not subjected to
potentially  unsavoury  problems,  it  is,  but  as  Brockway  and  Rajashekar  (1987)
advised:
Church groups should discuss, though not be discouraged by, potential local problems
that may arise from dialogue with people of new religious movements: will it imply
an endorsement  of the group and/or  its  activities?  Will  it  merely provide an easy
forum for the mission of the new religious movement? (pp. 177-178).
Even if these suspicions are true, although it may initially provide a superficial veneer
of respectability-by-association, and a platform for doctrinal dissemination, it will not
be able to sustain it if the inherent nature of the message is defective. Indeed, for the
suspicious, what better way to reveal deficiencies than by listening to it straight from
the proverbial horse’s mouth. After all, to be fair and rational, one must first listen
then consider before passing judgment. Nor does it mean that dialoguing is immune
from  being  used  for  unsavoury  purposes;  that  view  would  also  be  naive.  Why?
Because:
…one must not forget the political motives or purposes of the dialogue. This may be
to gain a greater measure of religious or political freedom, to obtain political support
for specific measures, especially those unpopular and not so easily achievable without
the support of the other, and so forth. Sometimes such purposes are not primary and
often they are part  of the "hidden agenda." When political  motives emerge as the
primary purpose of the dialogue, the chances are that no real dialogue will take place
or that it will soon deteriorate. The fate of the dialogue often depends on oscillating
political contingencies (Mojzes, 1989a, pp. 202-203).
Whether  these  contingencies  turn  out  to  be  important  factors  in  any  particular
dialogue or not, there is always the distinct possibility of failure because the Other’s
(perceived?) (mis?)behaviour has generated unsavoury consequences.
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Consequence #7 - Defection and Beyond: Confirmation of the
Worst?
This problem is an extension of the above-mentioned conversion and frustration fears,
but with far more devastating consequences, namely, the failure of "conceptual ahimsa
where religious differences are communicated without harm" (Dunbar, 1998, p. 462).
For example,  Christians may conclude that New Religious Movements (NRM) are
some form of evil incarnate. Thus dismissing the whole dialogue enterprise as "‘New
Age  thinking’,  seeing  behind  it  ‘a  neo-Hindu-Buddhist  plot’  for  the  ‘spiritual
takeover’ of the West" (Ariarajah, 1998, p. 14). This view can result in a deterioration
of relations between faiths (and the dialogue organisers). The decline may start as a
person-to-person  dispute,  but  it  can  inevitably  translate  into  a  religion-to-religion
dispute  with  the  equally  inevitable  rebuffs.  The  reporting  of  this  "failure"  being
relayed to coreligionists and further polluting their minds with anti-dialogue, and anti-
religious  sentiments  about  the  Other.  For  example,  an  informal  meeting  occurred
between Jehovah’s  Witnesses  and Orthodox Christians  which was  reported  to  the
Orthodox congregation as follows:
Recently I had an encounter with a young woman from the cult  of  the Jehovah’s
Witnesses.  She  came  to  my  office  ostensibly  to  ask  some  questions  about  the
Orthodox faith with an Orthodox friend of hers. She then promptly proceeded to lead
me through the New World mistranslation of the Bible trying to prove to me that the
Kingdom of God was a future situation in which Christ would establish His rule over
the earth and we would all live in Paradise. Eventually I asked her a question - ‘Have
you experienced the kingdom of God?’ She did not know what I was talking about.
How irrelevant is a gospel which has nothing to say about the existential concerns of
humanity which is only concerned with speculation about the future state - even the
Marxists can do better than that (Bozikis, 1999, p. 4).
Regrettably,  the  Revd.  Anastasios  Bozikis  was  very  unkind  and  uncharitable  by
character assassinating both her and the Jehovah’s Witnesses (JWs) faith. He did this
by:
(a) Using the negative, emotionally loaded word "cult" to describe her faith/religion.
(b) By comparing JWs to "Marxists" (i.e., religionists with non-religionists).
(c) By being derogatory and inferring that she/JWs were less competent than atheists.
(d) By (unnecessarily) ridiculing the JWs sacred text, the New World Translation of
the Holy Scriptures by calling it the "New World mistranslation of the Bible."
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(e) By suggesting that the JW "gospel" was "irrelevant" (not to JWs!).
(f) Because a young (brave?,  curious?)  woman (possibly academically mismatched
compared to the Revd.) was (supposedly) stumped by a (tangential?) question.
(g) Even if true, it was unfair because she was seeking scriptural answers rooted in the
Bible  as  opposed  to  the  Reverend’s  non-scriptural,  existential  reply  (for
oneupmanship reasons?).
(h) Which  (unfairly) indicated to the  Revd.  that  the JW religion was (supposedly)
invalid.
(i) And by (unnecessarily) inferring that this woman had a covert mission against the
(misogynist?,  affronted?)  Revd.  instead  of  an  obviously  keen  desire  to  debate  a
scriptural point in his offices (i.e., his home turf) in the company of a fellow Orthodox
(but not JW) companion.
If this was the type of response at the level of informal interreligious communications,
one  wonders what  interreligious  stress  could  be generated at  the official  dialogue
level?! Nor is such a worrying scenario of contempt restricted to immature, new or
foreign religions  and their  devotees.  For example,  Allan R.  Brockway (1987) was
secretary  for  Christian-Jewish  relations  in  the  World  Council  of  Churches.  He
reported  how  an  essentially  nonreligious,  a-theological  criteria  prevented
interreligious dialogue with a New Religious Movement. As he reported:
A case in point is the Unification Church, which has undertaken the most extensive
program of inter-religious dialogue now existing in the world. To date, we have not
accepted the oft-repeated invitation to participate in the dialogue it sponsors, but, on
the contrary, have shied away from it almost to the extent of being unwilling to speak
with Unification members. The operative criterion for this functional decision seems
to have been a negative evaluation of some of the practices of the Unification Church,
including (but not limited to) the identification of the Unification organization, Causa,
with right-wing dictatorships in Latin America; the conducting of multiple marriages;
and "brain-washing" in recruitment… (pp. 3-4).
Although there were dialogical concerns about Revd. Sun Myung Moon’s Moonies
(Moss  & Chryssides,  1986),  and  their  faith  was  the  subject  of  numerous  exposes
(Streiker, 1978), at least Brockway had courageously acted. Firstly, by acknowledging
the fact of their less desirable behaviour. Secondly, by realising that each religion had
and still has its obnoxious elements. Thirdly, by identifying the need to discuss the
matter  with each other.  And fifthly, by developing ways to  make better  decisions
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about similar New Religious Movements in the future. Cult/NRM scholar J. Gordon
Melton (2000) came to a similar realisation. As he confessed:
Several  approaches  have  dominated  our  response  to  New Religions  over  the  past
generation. Overwhelmingly, of course, we have simply ignored them. They have not
been taken seriously as religious communities, and their leaders have not been seen as
thinkers with a worthy perspective. Why waste time with shallow amateurs? With a
Karl Barth, a Karl Rahner, or a Carl Henry to read, why would we ever pick up a book
by an Aleister Crowley, L. Ron Hubbard, or Maharishi Mehesh Yogi? It has been
much easier to keep the wickedest man in the world, a mere science-fiction writer, or
the giggling guru at arms length. In doing so, we miss the fact that many who have
read their writings had found them to be quite mature, if unconventional, thinkers (p.
93).
Then of course there is the problem of the suppression and/or subversion of issues
during dialogues. For example, Sr. Ann Gillen (1987) reported her disenchantment at
the Copenhagen 1980 United Nations Conference on Women. As he complained:
In my opinion and from my perspective, Western groups, including those from the
United  States  and  Israel,  came  ready  to  dialogue;  the  opposing  coalition  came
determined not to dialogue but to dominate - both at the official meetings and at the
Almager  nongovernmental-organizational  meetings.  They came better  prepared  for
that  purpose,  with  their  "goon  squad"  tactics.  So,  Copenhagen  was  a  painful
experience  in  power  and  powerlessness.  As  a  woman  of  faith,  I  shared  in  the
frustration of women who saw their hopes for the agenda subverted. In a special way I
shared in the powerlessness of Jewish and Ukrainian women, both minorities scorned
by the powerful at Copenhagen (p. 137).
It was a situation that Sr. Gillen attributed to anti-Semitism, and the desire to censor
the stories of Soviet-generated suffering and oppression (in which case the goon squad
tactics were easily identifiable trademarks). Regrettably, censoring dialogues runs the
danger of isolating individual dialogues from each other, and of losing sight of the
precious indivisibility of the interfaith movement (Meyer, 1991, p. 281).
Another stage in this deterioration process is the public denouncement of the Other’s
faith. For example, Juliet Sheen (1994) reported how in Geneva 1984 she attended a
United  Nations  Seminar  on  encouraging  understanding,  tolerance  and  respect  for
religion and belief when:
A  vehemently  anti-semitic  address  by  the  Saudi  Arabian  delegate  shocked  the
Seminar delegates.  He was quoting from materials  about  the medieval  blood libel
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which he had learned in theology in university and had never questioned …his deluge
of century-old hate… (p. 16).
For  a  more  public  denunciation,  one  need  only  recall  Revd.  Ian  Paisley’s  Pope-
heckling, Anti-Christ accusations, and the deliberate, loutish disruption of ecumenical
services, and the associated placard parades (Bruce, 1986, pp. 215, 216, 228). Despite
years of contact with the Roman Catholic Church, this particular Free Presbyterian
still had grave difficulties and brought shame upon himself and his faith before the
whole world. From a public relations perspective, such behaviour is a disaster for the
Free  Presbyterians.  However,  it  was  a  godsend  for  the  Roman  Catholics  who
repeatedly showed calmness, magnanimity and maturity while under fire, as well as
toughness  and  organisational  competence  in  dealing  with  Revd.  Paisley  in  his
obnoxious mode.
Although  not  as  dramatic,  Colin  Brown  (1992,  p.  3)  reported  how  some  anti-
intellectual  Fundamentalists  counter-attacked  using  a  variety  of  biblically  based
passages.  Such as:  "‘Beware lest  any man spoil  you through philosophy and vain
deceit,  after  the  tradition  of  men,  after  the  rudiments  of  this  world  and  not  after
Christ.’ (Colossians 2:8)." However, the huge range of possible scriptural retorts was
not documented. The one good thing about virulent opposition however, is that it can
quickly burn itself out:  "Presumably no one who has responded negatively to that
exposure…is bothering to be engaged in further, on-going dialogue" (King, 1990, p.
122).  Indeed,  if  such  negative  delegates  persisted  then  it  is  another  indication  of
organisational failure in weeding out such undesirables (Kozlovic, 2001).
Another unfortunate characteristic of denouncers is their frequent failure to find out
what exactly triggered their wrath and then the means of resolving it. For example,
during  the  Nairobi  1975  World  Council  of  Churches’  Fifth  Assembly:  "Serious
confrontation between delegates  did take  place.  There were  some who considered
"non-Christian" religions as demonic and were opposed to any kind of dialogue or
efforts at  seeking community with them" (Samartha, 1981, p. 51). Fortunately, the
victims of this abuse were nonplussed and exhibited professional poise, tolerance and
quick-wittedness far in excess of their detractor’s behaviour:
The missiologist  who described all  non-Christian religions  as  demonic  missed the
chance of personally meeting these "non-Christian" guests to discover and perhaps
battle with "demonic" elements in them. At least  one of the guests [comprising of
Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim & Sikh representatives] expressed disappointment
that no one among those who talked loudest about proclamation actually came to him
or others personally to proclaim the love of God in Jesus Christ (Samartha, 1981, p.
57).
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Far worse than disillusioned participants avoiding future dialogues is to deliberately
oppose the  Other.  One has  only to  look at  some Iranian Muslim’s  perceptions  of
America  as  Satan  incarnate,  and  their  numerous  attacks  (polemical,  physical  and
deadly) to see this regrettable possibility in action. Disillusionment can also manifest
itself as increased proselytising activity, and faith reinforcing behaviour of the type
demonstrated  in  Festinger,  Riecken  and  Schachter’s  (1956)  study  of  UFO  cult
believers.
Of course, proselytising activity is not necessarily a direct result of dialoguing, but the
possibility  of  a  faith/religion/ideology  using  the  dialogue  for  political  gain  is
potentially there. Paul Mojzes (1989a, pp. 202-203) warned about his, while Sara S.
Lee (1991,  p.  189)  nervously reported:  "Needless  to  say the recent  desecration of
Torah scrolls in a Brooklyn synagogue reinforces Jewish fears of anti-Semitism and
reminds all  of us that such fears are certainly not groundless." Then there are the
conflicts that result directly from interreligious dialoguing itself. For example:
It happened at a recent interreligious gathering. At the other end of the building, in the
meditation room, some members of our group were learning Zen techniques while the
rest of us sat in the Gothic chapel waiting for mass to begin. Suddenly a commotion
broke out in the chancel. A Catholic priest from Tibet had grabbed the microphone
and was shouting something about Jesus Christ being the "only way, the truth and the
life!" A couple of other priests chased him around, trying to grab the microphone.
Then two men leaped out of the pews and joined the melee. I thought to myself. "Yes,
now I see that religious wars are possible. When the attackers found they couldn’t
bodily throw the interloper out without losing every sense of dignity and decorum, the
presiding  priest  asked  us  all  to  leave  and announced  the  mass  would  be  held  in
another  room.  Most  left.  I  stayed,  and  so  did  a  dozen others.  We listened to  the
priest’s impassioned rebuke. We were selling out our Christian faith, he said. The very
fact that we were conversing with "Buddhist idolators" was evidence that we had lost
our commitment to the Christ of God "who alone can bring us out of darkness into the
light." To conclude, he bowed and prayed for our souls (Peters, 1986, p. 883).
One imagines that such wayward guests are comparatively rare, but nonetheless, it
does  indicate  that  dialogue  organisers  need  to  be  prepared  for  many  possible
contingencies. Another regrettable manifestation of dialogue participation is when the
religion’s members begin to loose faith in their own representatives, and then nastily
turn on them:
Often  those  who  have  pioneered  the  search  for  good  relations  between  religious
communities  have  faced  misunderstanding  and  even  hostility  in  their  own  faith
community.  They  have  been  accused  of  compromising  or  "watering  down"  the
distinctive beliefs of their own religious traditions (Braybrooke, 1993b, p. 120).
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Prof. Harvey Cox (1989, p. 17) was keenly aware of this possibly. As he reported:
"One of the risks [of dialoguing] is running the possibility of being viewed by one’s
coreligionists with suspicion or distrust." Indeed, "people in any religious tradition
who are committed to dialogue often find themselves upbraided as turncoats by their
own brothers and sisters" (Cox, 1989, p. 2). For example, Methodist minister Revd.
Paula Niukula was considered:
…a great man who had done so much to try and promote dialogue and understanding
among the various religious and racial groups in Fiji. [However, for]…his efforts he
even had at times to suffer being ostracised by some members of his own Church who
felt he was going too far in his outreach to people of other faiths (Ahern, 1998, p. 3).
However, Prof. Cox’s (1989, p. 18) solution to the problem was, in principle, simple.
Namely:  "Perhaps  the  most  unexpected  thing I have  learned  in  the  dialogue  with
people of other religions is how important it is for me to keep in touch with those of
my  own  faith  community  who  remain  suspicious  and  fearful  of  that  dialogue."
Unfortunately, this solution is not always effective if politicking was involved, for as
Leonard Swidler (1990) noted regarding a Christian-Marxist dialogue:
One  notorious  example  on  the  Christian  side  was  that  of  Salesian  priest  Guido
Girardi, who for his continued dialogue with Marxists was fired from the Salesian
University in Rome and in September 1977 was expelled from the Salesian Society. A
similar fate overtook Roger Garaudy, Milan Machovec, Adam Schaff, and scores of
other Marxist scholars. Dialogue was obvious perceived by the power brokers as an
activity dangerous to them--and correctly so (p. 177).
Coreligionist contact is indeed important, but to avoid future unsavoury incidents, the
dialoguer’s congregation should be regularly briefed and debriefed per dialogue (if
only  as  a  courtesy  gesture),  and  by  consciously  deciding  to  eschew  politicking.
However, even sharing one’s insights about religious Others has its inherent dangers.
As Kenneth Cracknell (1987) reported:
I am…utterly lost for a response when I, or any other fellow-Christian, am reproached
for  sharing in  a  meeting organized by the  Unificationists  or  Scientologists,  or  for
visiting and accepting the hospitality of Rajneeshies or Hare Krishna devotees. Our
very being there is a form of authentic witness… (p. 164).
Fortunately, his subsequent logical argument provided another potential solution to
the problem:
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For Christians to draw boundaries and establish frontiers over which neither they nor
their fellow-Christians have to pass seems to me morally and theologically wrong.
Some  urge  for  example  that  to  talk  to  members  of  NRMs  [New  Religious
Movements] "gives them credibility", but I hear this as the sub-ethical language of
diplomacy; others  speak of rubbing shoulders with heretics,  but  I hear  this  as the
language of the Inquisition;  others  fear  the contamination  of the "demonic",  but  I
know this is to under-rate the expulsive power of the Holy Spirit; others suggest that
NRMs need "prophetic  denunciation" but  such denunciations  may well  prevent  us
from hearing what God might be wishing to say to us through such movements… We
cannot talk with people who have no wish to talk with us, but where ever there are
those who would enter into dialogue with us, we cannot refuse. There are no limits to
be set to dialogue (p. 165).
This advice also makes good rational, academic sense.
Conclusion
Clearly, there is more to religious dialoguing than first meets the eye! An a priori
understanding  of  the  above  logical  possibilities,  practical  outcomes  and  potential
solutions  would  significantly  moderate  delegate  expectations  for  future  events.
Professional  awareness  of  the  range,  depth  and  contours  of  these  dialogic
consequences  would  also  have  important  ramifications  for  both  participant
preparation and event organisation and hopefully lead to more fruitful engagements.
After all, to be forewarned is to be forearmed. Therefore, the sooner the profession
acknowledges these outcome contours, and actively encourages dialogue participation
(Kozlovic,  2002),  the  more  successful  will  future  events  become.  In  addition  to
enhancing  the  interpersonal  growth  of  participants,  and  lessening  the  chances  of
stagnation, decay or death of the entire enterprise. Further research into this important
praxis area is warranted, highly recommended and certainly long overdue.
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